A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) 
Introduction
In EUROCRYPT 2004, Boneh et al [4] proposed the public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme in which enables one to search for encrypted keywords without revealing the secret information of the original data.
Shortly after Boneh's pioneering work, Waters [17] showed that the PEKS scheme based on the bilinear pairing can be applied to build encrypted and searchable audit logs. Golle [13] proposed schemes that allow for conjunctive keyword queries on encrypted data. Boneh and Waters [5] extend PEKS to support conjunctive, subset, and range comparisons over the keywords. Recently, Zhang [19] presented an efficient public key encryption with conjunctive-subset keywords search and Sedghi et al [16] presented a scheme that allow searching keywords with wildcards on encrypted data. Since the fact that keywords are chosen from much smaller space than passwords and users usually use wellknown keywords for search, the papers [6, 14, 15, 18] studied the off-Line keyword guessing attacks on PEKS. The drawback of the Boneh's scheme [4] is that it uses a between Alice and the email server. To build a secure channel is usually expensive. Recently, Baek [2] proposed an alternative solution to eliminate the need for a secure channel. In 2009, Fang [8] proposed an efficient and secure channel free public key encryption with keyword search scheme without random oracle [11] . As emphasizedby Baek [13] , however, that previous requirement is concerned only with the security of a PEKS part of the ciphertext and is not concerned with the security of the integrated scheme that combines PKE ciphertext and PEKS ciphertext.
PEKS + CCA secure PKE is not equal to CCA secure PEKSD. Combining two ciphertexts often invites malleability-style attacks on the (IND-CCA) security of an encryption scheme [21] . PEKS should not be treated as a stand-alone scheme, and it is important to carefully define and analyze a scheme in which PEKS is combined with PKE.
Related Work. For practice-oriented, there are mainly two types of practical combining PKE and PEKS scheme.
adaptive chosen keyword attack and chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model. Zhang and Imai [20] presented a generic construction which provide data privacy and keyword privacy without random oracles. The limitation of this solution provides decryption of the PKE part of the ciphertext, it does not allow to retrieve the PEKS keyword, also it does not guarantee any relation between message and keyword.  The previous scheme does not retrieve both the message and the keyword.  . We argue that their model is not realistic by prohibiting this test query. Actually, in the real environment, a malicious may get the relation between a keyword and a ciphertext related with certain keyword through interacting with the email server. Therefore, a natural question to ask is how to permit this test query in the model. Our Contributions. In this paper, we present two efficient and secure searchable encryption with decryption scheme. Our first scheme in section 3(we call it 1  ) only consider retrieve keyword. We first enhance the security model of searchable encryption with decryption scheme(PEKSD) by allowing the test query. Based on the truncated q-ABDHE assumption, we prove its chosen keyword attack and chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA) security without random oracle. Fuhr and Paillier [9] left an open problem on how to come up with a decryptable PEKS which security does not rely on random oracles, thus it is not easy to design a PEKSD scheme without random oracle. And then, we extend our scheme 1  to obtain PEKSD with independent decryption key and trapdoor derivation key.
Our second scheme from section 4(we call it 2  ) fully secure without random oracles and has several advantages over previous such systems, including: retrieve the message, retrieve the keyword and allow test query. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first PEKS scheme that allow to retrieve both the PEKS keyword and the message.
Applications of This Work. One application of DPEKS is routing. Suppose Bob sends encrypted email to Alice using Alice's public key. Both the contents of a header information, a body and the keywords are encrypted. Alice uses different electronic devices to read her email, and may prefer emails to be routed to her devices depending on the associated keyword. For example, she may like to receive emails with the keyword "urgent" On her mobile phone, emails with the keyword "agenda" on her PDA, and all other emails (with keywords "paper", "advertisement", "bill") on her desktop computer. Since the decryption key and the trapdoor derivation key belong to Alice, Alice is the only person who can decrypt it. This way, Alice can give the trapdoor of the keywords to the mail gateway and hence can make routing decisions correctly.
Also Alice need to decrypt the encrypted email to read the message(i.e. retrieve the message), and she may want to sort using keywords or search the email with the keyword "paper" on her desktop computer(i.e. retrieve the keyword).
Definitions -142 -
In this section, we first review the complexity assumption required in our schemes, and then provide the definition and security of a public key encryption with keyword search scheme.
Negligible Function
is a non-polynomially-bounded quantity in n .
Bilinear Maps
Let 12 , GGbe multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p , and g be a generator of 1 G . We say 
Searchable Encryption with Decryption
In the following, we now provide the definition of a searchable public key encryption with decryption (PEKSD) scheme (only consider retrieve the keyword) and the game-based security definition model. The definition of PEKSD (i.e. retrieve the keyword) scheme is much closer to the Fuhr and Paillier's scheme. Finally, we will extend the PEKSD (i.e. retrieve the keyword) scheme to the decryptable PEKS in which the receiver can both retrieve the keyword and the message. Definition 1(PEKSD) A PEKSD scheme (i.e. retrieve the keyword) is identical to a PEKS scheme, only that the secret key allows to also decrypt ciphertexts (in the usual PKE sense). Formally, a EKSD scheme comprises of following algorithms:
KeyGen   Takes a security parameter  . Output the public/secret pair ( , ) pk sk of receive R . In the following, we provide the game-based security definition of PEKSD, which we call indistinguishability of PEKSD against chosen keyword attack and chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA).
Definition 2(IND-CKCA)
Let  be the security parameter and A be the adversary. We consider the following game. A PEKSD scheme is only allowed to retrieve the keyword. To retrieve the message, we define decryptable public key encryption with keyword search (DPEKS) scheme. A decryptable public key encryption with keyword search (DPEKS) scheme is the same as the PEKSD scheme except 
Retrieve the Keyword: New PEKSD Scheme
In this section, we only consider the situation that the PEKSD scheme that can retrieve the keyword while the next section we give out the DPEKS scheme that can both retrieve the keyword and the message. We will give our new searchable encryption with decryption scheme(PEKSD) in which only consider the situation that allow to retrieve the keyword. And then we extend our scheme to obtain PEKSD scheme with independent decryption key and trapdoor derivation key.
Our Construction
Fuhr and Paillier [9] left an open problem on how to come up with a DSE which security does not rely on random oracles, thus it is not easy to design a PEKSD scheme without random oracle. For completeness, we will give our searchable encryption with decryption scheme(PEKSD) as follows. Let Correctness. It is straightforward to verify that all correctly generated PEKS ciphertext can be correctly tested by the server who has the correct trapd oor and can be correctly decrypt by the receive who has the secret key.
Security of Our PEKSD
In this subsection, we prove the IND-CKCA security for our scheme without any random oracle.  Trapdoor query< w >: / y m C C  ciphertext attack (IND-CKCA) security without random oracle. Our scheme is more efficient than previous scheme, and we allow test query in our security model. Then, we modify our scheme to achieve PEKSD with independent decryption key and trapdoor derivation key. Finally, we also extend our scheme to achieve a DPEKS scheme in which it allows to retrieve both the PEKS keyword and the message.
